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Exposure Without Redress: A Proposed Remedial Tool for 
the Victims Who Were Set Aside* 
I. Introduction: Said the Joker to the Thief 
When former CIA employee Edward Snowden drew back the curtain on 
the extent to which government security agencies gather information on the 
American people, it became a running joke that every e-mail and phone call 
is scrutinized by the National Security Agency (NSA) or other government 
officials. After law enforcement officers arrested a citizen who attempted to 
jump over the White House fence to spray paint a political message, late-
night comedy host Jimmy Fallon joked, “If that guy really wanted to get a 
message to the President, he could have just written it in an e-mail to 
literally anyone.”1 Later, when the American citizenry expressed outrage 
over the extent of the NSA’s domestic spying practices, political satirist 
Stephen Colbert responded, “Nation, the President has heard your calls for 
more oversight! In fact, he’s heard all [of] your calls.”2  
Regardless of the comedic value of “Big Brother’s” monitoring tactics, 
informational privacy is an important and highly personal concern for many 
people. Our desire for control over private information has increased 
despite a growing perspective that privacy is dead.3 The private nature of 
our personal information may seem illusory in light of the myriad inevitable 
situations in which we surrender our personal information in exchange for 
common services. Applications for employment, mortgages, payroll direct 
deposit, and utilities like electricity and water all require the surrender of 
sensitive personal information as a matter of course.4 In fact, employers 
                                                                                                                 
 * Heartfelt thanks and acknowledgements go to the hard-working editorial team at the 
Oklahoma Law Review, to Professor Joseph Thai for his insight and support, and to my 
husband William Isaacs for serving as my sounding board as well as my partner. 
 1. Late Night Political Humor, POLITICAL IRONY, http://www.politicalirony.com/2013/ 
06/22/late-night-political-humor-999/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). This quote was 
transcribed from a Late Night with Jimmy Fallon monologue, which was broadcast on NBC 
on Jun. 13, 2013.  
 2. NSA Press Conference on Domestic Spying, COLBERT REP., http://thecolbertreport. 
cc.com/videos/jngkv0/nsa-press-conference-on-domestic-spying (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 3. See Alan Henry, Why You Should Care About and Defend Your Privacy, 
LIFEHACKER (Apr. 25, 2012), http://lifehacker.com/5904966/why-you-should-care-about-
and-defend-your-privacy. 
 4. See Barbara Kiviat, Guarding Your Social Security Number, TIME (Dec. 4, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1690827,00.html. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
520 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:519 
 
 
need social security information to pay their employees, and banks are 
required to retain customers’ social security numbers to comply with 
federal regulation.5 So in some situations, giving out a social security 
number is unavoidable. 
The inevitability of having to disclose private information does little to 
console the individual who receives a phone call or letter informing him 
that his private information may have leaked due to a data breach. That 
notification can precipitate a highly stressful and emotionally taxing time as 
the customer tries to regain control over his informational privacy.  
An individual should address a data breach situation in three basic 
stages. The first step is to identify what type of information was subject to 
the breach.6 An account number may allow an identity thief to make 
fraudulent charges on an existing account, which may not surface until the 
account-holder specifically reviews account activity.7 But if the 
compromised information includes a social security number, the potential 
damage is even more insidious because a thief could open fraudulent 
accounts that are much harder to detect, which could lead to more out-of-
pocket costs for the victim.8  
Second, the customer must address potential compromise of existing 
accounts. The customer may monitor account activity closely for fraudulent 
transactions on financial statements, online, or by phone.9 The customer 
may also cancel the existing account and open a new one with a different 
number.10 Changing account numbers then creates more hassle by 
necessitating notification of other institutions that have authorization to 
withdraw automatically from the compromised account. Otherwise, they 
will not have the correct or updated account numbers from which to 
withdraw. When other institutions cannot withdraw funds, they may 
                                                                                                                 
 5. KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL3, THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
NUMBER: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ITS COLLECTION, DISCLOSURE, AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY 13-14 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30318.pdf 
(citing 31 C.F.R. 103.121(b)). 
 6. Fact Sheet 17b: How to Deal with a Security Breach, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/how-to-deal-security-breach (last visited 
May 11, 2015) [hereinafter How to Deal with a Security Breach]. 
 7. Fact Sheet 17: Coping with Identity Theft: Reducing the Risk of Fraud, PRIVACY 
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/coping-identity-theft-reducing-risk-
fraud (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
 8. Kiviat, supra note 4. 
 9. How to Deal with a Security Breach, supra note 6. 
 10. Id. 
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discontinue their services, assess fees, or report nonpayment to a credit 
bureau. 
Third, the customer must address the risk of new fraudulent accounts 
appearing if the data breach exposed his personally identifying information, 
such as social security number and driver’s license information.11 He may 
choose to order and review copies of his credit report, hire a service to 
monitor his credit report, or do nothing on the hope that he will not find out 
that his account has been cleaned out the next time he tries to pay for 
dinner.12  
Uncertainty fuels not only the difficulty in choosing a practical course of 
action, but also feelings of violation and helplessness. Sometimes 
notification of a data breach arrives with as little detail as “Your address 
and account number may have been compromised.” The customer is left 
thinking, “How did the data breach happen? Did a group of criminal 
masterminds break the bank’s encryption and steal the data in order to sell 
it to identity thieves? Did a disgruntled employee post a series of customer 
account snapshots on a random internet forum? Did a technologically savvy 
teenager decide he wanted to know where, when, and how often a bank’s 
customers purchase liquor, gamble online, and buy medication? Or did 
someone neglect to shred a bag of paper that may be lost and will never be 
seen again?” Whether the vulnerable data is likely to be used immediately 
for identity theft is not the only concern. Compromised data could remain 
available and useful to identity thieves in perpetuity and may be distributed 
to any number of third parties because data is easy to replicate and 
distribute. 
Customers have attempted to sue vendors that have experienced data 
breaches, basing their claims on theories of breach of implied contract, 
negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, even before 
identity theft occurred.13 Because plaintiffs bring these as class actions 
before the occurrence of fraudulent use of the breached data, the injuries 
alleged are, at most, increased risk of identity theft and emotional distress 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. E.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2007); Reilly v. 
Ceridian Corp., No. 10-5142 (JLL), 2011 WL 735512, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011), aff’d, 
664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011).  
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resulting from the defendant’s failure to adequately protect the plaintiffs’ 
data.14 
The road to recovery of damages in a federal suit for increased risk of 
identity theft is littered with obstacles from beginning to end. Courts do not 
even agree on whether plaintiffs have standing to bring the action.15 Article 
III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution creates standing in federal court. In 
this context, the analysis turns on whether an increase in risk of future harm 
constitutes sufficient injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing,16 or 
whether they are merely “allegations of hypothetical, future injury[, which] 
do not establish standing under Article III.”17 There is currently a split 
among circuit courts about whether a plaintiff has standing to sue for 
increased risk of identity theft.18 Although initial decisions in district courts 
did not recognize standing,19 the Seventh and Ninth Circuits held that 
plaintiffs had standing based on similar rationales to other claims for future 
harm that currently recognize standing.20 However, the Third Circuit has 
now created conflict with the other two courts with a well-reasoned but 
criticized opinion that denied standing.21 
Even when courts recognize standing for suits alleging increased fraud 
risk, plaintiffs face obstacles in meeting prima facie elements of common 
law negligence and breach of implied contract because courts hold that 
increased fraud risk does not present a compensable injury.22 Further 
analysis suggests that plaintiffs would have difficulties proving other prima 
facie elements such as actual and legal causation, and breach of standard of 
care.23 Therefore, a plaintiff is unlikely to recover damages even if the suit 
survives a challenge to standing. 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to 
Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1365, 1369 (2013). 
 15. Id. at 1370. 
 16. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (Toc), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). 
 17. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 18. See infra text at Part II.C. 
 19. See infra text at Part II.B. 
 20. See infra text at Part II.C.1. 
 21. See infra text at Part II.C.2. 
 22. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635-40 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 23. See infra text at Part III. 
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Some legal scholars have called for comprehensive legislation on 
protection of private data,24 including (in some cases) establishment of a 
private right of action for claims based on increased fraud risk (Data Breach 
Claims).25 Other scholars have proposed judicial recognition of increased 
fraud risk as sufficient to meet the “injury-in-fact” requirement for standing 
in federal courts.26 
This Comment reviews obstacles to recovery in a Data Breach Claim in 
detail. Part II analyzes the circuit split regarding standing and explains how 
the Third Circuit’s latest decision, which developed a test for standing in 
Data Breach Claims, is more consistent with established law. Part III 
discusses the inefficacy of common law causes of action as bases for Data 
Breach Claims because these cases lack key prima facie elements. Part IV 
compares proposed legislative solutions and creates a sketch for a private 
right of action. A statutory right to sue would provide effective redress to 
plaintiffs, and should take into consideration current obstacles in data 
breach litigation. 
II. There’s Too Much Confusion 
A. A Basic Under-“standing” 
Federal jurisdiction is limited to actual “cases or controversies.”27 In 
order to invoke federal jurisdiction, plaintiffs have the burden of 
establishing three essential elements.28 The first element plaintiffs must 
show is that they have suffered an “injury in fact.”29 Over time, the 
Supreme Court has refined the definition of injury in fact to require three 
basic elements. An injury in fact is an invasion of a legally protected 
interest that is “(a) concrete and particularized, . . . and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”30 Second, plaintiffs must 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand On: Finding Plaintiffs a 
Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data Security Breach Suits, 62 
CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 769 (2013); Lori Chiu, Comment, Drawing the Line Between 
Competing Interests: Strengthening Online Data Privacy Protection in an Increasingly 
Networked World, 14 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 281, 283-84 (2013). 
 25. Cave, supra note 24, at 769. 
 26. Galbraith, supra note 14, at 1371-72. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 28. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1973). 
 29. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 30. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (summarizing 
requirements for an injury in fact as developed in Supreme Court cases over time). 
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demonstrate that the injury is “‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged 
action of the defendant and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action 
of some third party not before the court.’”31 Third, plaintiffs must show it is 
“likely,” and not “merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by 
a favorable decision.”32 
Legally protected interests, for purposes of determining injury in fact, 
may include common law rights (established by property, contract, and tort 
law), constitutional rights, and statutory rights created by Congress.33 A 
statutory right may confer standing even if the plaintiff’s injury would not 
have been judicially cognizable at common law.34 However, this does not 
give Congress unlimited authority to create causes of action. Although 
Congress may define protected rights for individuals and expand Article III 
standing to protect those rights, it is improper for the legislature to reach 
beyond the limits of Article III to allow citizens to sue for general 
enforcement of laws without some particularized injury.35  
For example, in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the Supreme 
Court recognized a “right to information” created by statute that would not 
have existed absent the statute.36 The plaintiffs alleged sufficiently 
particularized injury because they were unable to obtain specifically sought 
information.37 In contrast, the Court held in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
that Congress could not create standing by including a statutory clause 
allowing any private individual to enjoin a government agency’s violation 
of the Endangered Species Act.38 The right to enforce the statute in 
Defenders of Wildlife protected the survival chances of endangered species, 
which did not cause an injury by directly harming any plaintiff.39 Even 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 32. Id. at 561 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 69-72 (4th 
ed. 2011) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. 
 34. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975). 
 35. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 70-72 (comparing the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of statutory basis for standing in Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972), to the Court’s refusal to recognize a statutory basis for 
standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992)). 
 36. Id. at 72 (citing 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 71 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-63). In essence, a statute that 
allows a citizen to enforce a law that protects a public right, rather than an individual right, 
warps the constitutional role of the judicial branch. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576-
77. 
 39. 504 U.S. at 558-59, 562-63. 
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though some plaintiffs alleged that they had visited the animals’ habitats in 
the past, they did not testify to any plans (beyond general possibility) to 
visit the habitats in the future.40 
The same analysis likely applies in federal court even when that court is 
dealing with a state law that confers standing in state court. In 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court recognized California’s right to 
allow proponents to defend their challenged initiatives in state court, but 
still required satisfaction of Article III requirements to invoke federal 
jurisdiction.41  
In establishing “injury in fact,” the Supreme Court has held that 
assertions of “possible future injury” that are not “certainly impending” are 
too speculative to satisfy Article III requirements.42 For example, in City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing 
to seek an injunction against police chokeholds even after a plaintiff 
allegedly suffered an illegal chokehold at the hands of arresting officers.43 
The plaintiff’s alleged risk of future injury relied on speculation that he 
would later be stopped by police and subjected to an illegal choke.44 In 
another case, Diamond v. Charles, a pediatrician sought to appeal a case 
that struck down his state’s anti-abortion law.45 The appellant-pediatrician 
alleged that failure to enforce the law would injure his professional practice 
by reducing the number of potential patients by the number of otherwise 
illegal abortions performed.46 The Court held that the appellant lacked 
standing because his asserted interest was based on unadorned speculation 
that fetuses saved from abortion “would survive and then find their way as 
patients to [the appellant].”47 
The second and third requirements for Article III standing require a 
causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s 
injury, and a remedial relationship between the plaintiff’s injury and the 
relief sought. The requirement of causation necessitates that the injury is 
not “highly indirect and [does not result] ‘from the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.’”48 Redressability requires that the 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 562-64. 
 41. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667-68 (2013). 
 42. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). 
 43. 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). 
 44. Id. 
 45. 476 U.S. 54, 56-61 (1986). 
 46. Id. at 66. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984) (internal citation omitted), abrogated by 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387-88 (2014). 
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prospective relief sought will remove the harm.49 If the grant of the relief 
sought will not make a difference in the plaintiff’s injury, then a judicial 
disposition is no more than an advisory opinion.50 
The driving force behind standing doctrine is consideration of whether 
the case in question is appropriate to be determined by the judiciary or by 
other branches of the federal government.51 In writing both for the Court52 
and in other legal scholarship,53 Justice Antonin Scalia stated that standing 
restricts the jurisdiction of the court in the interest of separation of powers 
by preventing judicial intervention in other branches of government in the 
name of furthering majority interests.54 In other words, standing doctrine 
should prevent judicial involvement when plaintiffs are attempting to 
further the general interests of a group of people, but plaintiffs themselves 
suffer no injury in fact.55 In these cases, redress should come from the 
legislature or executive, which are designed to promote and enforce 
majority interests.56 
In the case of a class action, the plaintiffs that represent the class must 
have standing derived from their own claims in order to seek relief.57 The 
rationale behind this requirement is that in order to ensure rigorous 
advocacy on behalf of a party, the representative party must have a 
“‘personal stake in the outcome.’”58 
B. No Leg to Stand on in Federal District Courts 
Initial cases against entities that experienced data breaches resulted in a 
variety of positions among the federal district courts.59 A few district courts 
declined to recognize standing based on increased risk of identity theft.60 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975). 
 50. See CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 34, at 78-79. 
 51. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic 
idea—the idea of separation of powers.”). 
 52. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). 
 53. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983). 
 54. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 559-60; Scalia, supra note 53, at 894-96.  
 55. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573-74. 
 56. Id. at 576-77. 
 57. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-95 (1974). 
 58. Id. at 493-94 (citation omitted). 
 59. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability for Risk of Future Identity Theft, 50 
A.L.R.6th 33, 43-46 (2009). 
 60. E.g., Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 WL 2850042, at *2 
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (“Because ‘assertions of potential future injury do not satisfy the 
injury-in-fact test,’ [p]laintiff’s claims must be dismissed for lack of standing.” (internal 
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Other district courts used similar reasoning, but found lacking prima facie 
elements (namely compensable injury) of the cases.61 Although rulings on 
the merits may support an inference that these latter courts implicitly 
recognized standing, the issue of standing does not appear to have been 
argued and no opinions specifically find that a plaintiff had standing based 
on increased fraud risk.62 Thus, the application of standing doctrine to data 
breach claims was largely unsettled and inconsistent before the federal 
appellate courts weighed in on the issue. 
C. The So-Called Circuits’ Standing Split 
Federal appellate courts disagree on whether increased risk of identity 
theft is sufficient to support standing. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
recognize standing (contrary to the initial trend in lower courts).63 The 
Third Circuit, however, has declined to recognize standing.64 Although 
legal scholars interpret this as a circuit split,65 the latest circuit decision may 
also be interpreted as having created a test to determine standing in light of 
pleaded facts that were insufficient to show that any harm actually 
occurred.  
1. Initial Circuits Stand United 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits currently recognize standing for data 
breach suits as a result of decisions in 2007 and 2010, respectively. Both 
decisions rested on analogy to other valid claims for risk of future injury, 
such as toxic exposure and defective medical devices.66 
                                                                                                                 
citation omitted)); Key v. DSW Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“Because 
[p]laintiff has failed to allege that she suffered injury-in-fact that was either ‘actual or 
imminent,’ this Court is precluded from finding that she has standing under Article III.”).  
 61. E.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020-21 (D. Minn. 
2006) (granting summary judgment to defendant on claims of negligence and breach of 
contract because plaintiffs had “shown no present injury or reasonably certain future injury 
to support damages for any alleged increased risk of harm”); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe 
Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (dismissing complaint 
because “there [was] reason to believe that Michigan’s highest court would reject a novel 
legal theory of damages which is based on a risk of injury at some indefinite time in the 
future”). 
 62. See Zitter, supra note 59. 
 63. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old 
Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting plaintiffs had standing to sue, even 
though the damages the plaintiffs sought were not compensable as a matter of law). 
 64. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 65. E.g., Cave, supra note 24, at 773; Galbraith, supra note 14, at 1381-85. 
 66. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142; Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 n.3. 
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a) Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp (Seventh Circuit) 
The Seventh Circuit recognized standing for increased fraud risk in 
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp—the first federal appeals case to do so.67 
In Pisciotta, the defendant-bank had collected personal data from 
consumers who applied for loans through the bank’s website.68 The 
personal data for each plaintiff-customer depended on the different 
applications submitted to the website, but overall, the data included names, 
addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, 
and financial account information.69 The data collected by Old National 
Bancorp was compromised after the bank’s web hosting facility 
experienced a data breach that was characterized in a subsequent 
investigation as “sophisticated, intentional, and malicious.”70 The plaintiffs 
sued the bank on state common law theories of negligence and breach of 
implied contract.71 
The Seventh Circuit noted that at the time, many district courts 
(including the trial court in Pisciotta) had held that they lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had not yet suffered sufficient injury 
in fact to satisfy Article III standing requirements.72 However, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed, citing cases from other circuit courts in which threat of 
future harm that resulted from exposure to toxic substances and use of 
defective medical devices satisfied standing requirements.73 The Pisciotta 
court explained its decision through citations, in two footnotes, that referred 
to other types of cases involving threat of future harm.74 The footnotes 
included no explanation of why standing was recognized in the cited cases 
and no analogy to data breaches beyond the fact that increased fraud risk is 
also threat of future harm.75 With that being the extent of its standing 
analysis, the Pisciotta court turned to the merits of the action.76  
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the cause of action for failure 
to meet prima facie elements of the common law claims.77 The court 
                                                                                                                 
 67. 499 F.3d at 633-34. 
 68. Id. at 631. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 632. 
 71. Id. at 633. 
 72. Id. at 634. 
 73. Id. at 634 nn.3-4. 
 74. Id.  
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 635-40. 
 77. Id. at 640. 
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declined to expand Indiana state law to recognize increased fraud risk as 
“compensable damages” sufficient for either negligence or breach of 
implied contract actions.78 The plaintiffs sought compensation for credit-
monitoring services resulting from the data breach.79 The Seventh Circuit 
analyzed whether “the harm caused by identity information exposure, 
coupled with the attendant costs to guard against identity theft, constitutes 
an existing compensable injury and consequent damages to state a claim for 
negligence or for breach of contract.”80 The court reviewed three sources of 
guidance in its analysis: Indiana statutes, Indiana cases, and cases 
interpreting other states’ laws. 
First, the Seventh Circuit looked to Indiana state statutes.81 After the 
defendant’s data breach occurred, Indiana passed a data breach statute, 
which imposed an affirmative duty on private database owners to disclose a 
data breach to potentially affected consumers.82 The statute did not create a 
duty to compensate individuals affected by the breach; nor did it create a 
private right of action for consumers to sue the database owner.83 Because 
the sole remedies provided by the statute were state-enforced penalties, the 
court concluded that state legislation did not support recognition of credit-
monitoring costs as compensable damages.84 
Second, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Indiana cases involving 
comparable issues.85 The closest analogy, found in cases for toxic tort 
liability, afforded no more support than given by state legislation.86 The 
Supreme Court of Indiana’s cases suggested that compensable injury occurs 
when a plaintiff could be reasonably diagnosed with actual illness or 
disease, rather than at the time of exposure to toxic substances.87 In fact, 
Indiana case law indicated that medical-monitoring costs resulting from 
exposure to toxic substances were not recoverable.88 
Third, the Seventh Circuit looked to case law interpreting other states’ 
laws with respect to recovery of credit-monitoring costs.89 After reviewing 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. at 637, 639. 
 79. Id. at 632. 
 80. Id. at 635. 
 81. Id. at 636-37. 
 82. Id. at 636. 
 83. Id. at 637. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 637-39. 
 86. Id. at 638-39. 
 87. Id. at 639. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 639-40. 
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cases from Ohio, Minnesota, Arizona, and Michigan, the court concluded 
that state laws overwhelmingly do not recognize increased risk of identity 
theft alone as compensable injury.90 
b) Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. (Ninth Circuit) 
The Ninth Circuit employed a more rigorous analysis of standing 
doctrine in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.91 In this case, plaintiffs were then-
current and former Starbucks employees whose unencrypted names, 
addresses, and social security numbers were contained in a laptop that was 
stolen from Starbucks.92 The laptop contained the personal data of 
approximately 97,000 employees.93 Twenty days after the breach, Starbucks 
sent a letter to all affected employees to notify them of the breach and offer 
a year of free credit-monitoring services through Equifax.94 Despite receipt 
of these services, the plaintiffs alleged that they still spent “substantial 
amounts of time” monitoring for fraudulent activity and suffered anxiety 
and stress as a result of the data breach.95 The plaintiffs sued on grounds of 
negligence and breach of implied contract.96 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not address whether a data breach claim 
satisfies the second and third requirements for standing because those 
requirements were undisputed before the district court.97 However, because 
standing is determinative of whether there is proper subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit was still under an independent duty to discuss 
the second and third requirements sua sponte if they presented barriers to 
standing.98   
The Ninth Circuit separately analyzed whether emotional distress and 
increased fraud risk could be sufficient injury in fact to confer standing. As 
a present injury, one plaintiff’s allegation of “generalized anxiety and 
stress” was sufficient to confer standing, but only as to that plaintiff.99 The 
Ninth Circuit referred to its own decisional history regarding future injury, 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. 628 F.3d 1139, 1141-43 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 92. Id. at 1140. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1140-41. 
 95. Id. at 1141. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. (“We have an independent obligation to examine standing to determine 
whether it comports with the case or controversy requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution.”). 
 99. Id. at 1141-42. 
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in which it had previously held that “the possibility of future injury may be 
sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs; threatened injury constitutes 
‘injury in fact.’”100 However, the threatened future injury must pose an 
“immediate” danger of “direct injury,” and not be conjectural or 
hypothetical in order to constitute injury in fact.101  
Like the Seventh Circuit in Pisciotta, the Ninth Circuit analogized 
increased risk of identity theft to suits arising from exposure to toxic 
substances and from harm to the environment.102 Plaintiffs in need of 
medical monitoring services satisfied requirements for injury in fact, and 
environmental claims asserting threatened future injury sufficiently 
established injury in fact.103 The Ninth Circuit held that the increased risk of 
identity theft was not too hypothetical or conjectural in light of the facts; 
the criminal element in the theft of the laptop made the risk of identity theft 
a “credible threat of real and immediate harm.”104 Had the suit been brought 
before the laptop was stolen on the theory that the possible future theft of 
the laptop created an increased risk of identity theft, the court stated the 
injury would then be too speculative and conjectural.105 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit may have based its decision on the fact that a criminal act had 
already been perpetrated by a third party that lends itself to the inference 
that identity theft is likely to result.  
Even after deciding that increased fraud risk is sufficient to confer 
standing, however, the Ninth Circuit issued a separate memorandum 
opinion dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim of negligence due to a lack of 
compensable injury, and dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim of breach of 
implied contract due to separate factual grounds.106 Regarding the issue of 
compensable injury, the Ninth Circuit quoted Washington case law: “The 
mere danger of future harm, unaccompanied by present damage, will not 
support a negligence action.”107 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
plaintiff’s injuries originated from the risk of future harm, and thus were 
not recoverable.108  
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 1142 (quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 
(9th Cir. 2002)). 
 101. Id. (quoting Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1143. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App’x 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 107. Id. at 131 (quoting Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975)). 
 108. Id. 
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Until the emergence of the Third Circuit’s opinion on standing, the only 
other indication of disagreement was dicta from the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth 
Circuit had recognized standing for actual financial harm resulting from 
fraudulent conduct, but had indicated that mere increased risk of identity 
theft in the future was “somewhat ‘hypothetical’ and ‘conjectural.’”109 
However, until the Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,110 
the only circuit courts to rule on standing for increased risk of identity theft 
held that the plaintiffs had standing. 
2. The Third Circuit Stands Alone 
The court in Reilly based its opinion in part on a standard developed 
from its own prior decisions—that prospective damages are too conjectural 
when the asserted injury cannot be described “without beginning the 
explanation with the word ‘if.’”111 This standard is a plain-language way of 
explaining that threat of future harm cannot constitute injury in fact when 
that threat is predicated on a malicious act of a third party, and there is no 
evidence that the act is likely to occur.112  
Interestingly, the Third Circuit asserted that Pisciotta and Krottner were 
inapposite because those cases involved conduct by potential identity 
thieves that more convincingly indicated that they were trying to use the 
stolen data for fraudulent purposes.113 For example, the Third Circuit noted 
that in Pisciotta, the data breach was “sophisticated, intentional, and 
malicious” and resulted in actual unsuccessful attempts to open fraudulent 
accounts.114 The Third Circuit characterized other circuits’ analogy of 
increased fraud risk to defective-medical-device, toxic-substance-exposure, 
and environmental-injury cases as “skimpy rationale” because the analogy 
ignored basic elements of standing such as imminence of injury.115 
Consistent with the test that requires injuries to be explainable without 
beginning with the word “if,” the Third Circuit distinguished data breach 
cases because in the other three types of cases, the damage has already 
occurred and has yet to manifest itself over time.116 In the case of a data 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (discussing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th 
Cir. 2008)). 
 110. 664 F.3d 38 (2011). 
 111. Id. at 43. 
 112. See id.  
 113. Id. at 43-44. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 44. 
 116. Id. at 45. 
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breach, the plaintiffs must wait and see if some hypothetical third party 
would in fact inflict the damage.  
The Third Circuit also distinguished the type of injury in terms of social 
importance. In cases involving defective medical devices and exposure to 
toxic substances, the injury alleged is human suffering or premature 
death.117 The rationale behind recognizing this type of prospective risk of 
injury is that “[w]aiting for a plaintiff to suffer physical injury before 
allowing any redress whatsoever is both overly harsh and economically 
inefficient.”118 In environmental injury cases, the Third Circuit 
characterized the injury as one that is not remediable by monetary 
compensation.119 The Third Circuit drew a sharp contrast between 
protecting natural resources and endangered species, which cannot be done 
through monetary compensation, and restoring victims of data breach, 
which is a monetary solution to an essentially monetary problem.120 The 
opinion did not acknowledge increased risk of identity theft as an injury to 
one’s very identity. It did not explain how the inadequacy of monetary 
damages as a remedy supports recognition of standing rather than cuts 
against the requirement that an injury be redressable. 
The Third Circuit did not close the door completely on granting standing 
for increased risk of identity theft. In dictum, the court stated that the 
plaintiffs would sustain sufficient injury if they could show that the party 
that committed the data breach: “(1) read, copied, and understood [the 
plaintiffs’] personal information; (2) intends to commit future criminal acts 
by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information to the 
detriment of [the plaintiffs] by making unauthorized transactions in 
[plaintiffs’] names.”121  
The three criteria indicate that different facts involving the same central 
issue of increased risk of identity theft could be the basis of a proper action 
because if the criteria are met, then standing doctrine may be satisfied with 
respect to causation and redressability. By pleading facts that make it more 
likely that the ultimate harm—identity theft—will occur by fraudulent use 
of data obtained from the defendant’s data breach, a plaintiff is more likely 
to show that the increased risk of identity theft is both “fairly traceable to 
the challenged actions of the defendant,”122 and less speculative.  
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. (quoting Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 45-46. 
 121. Id. at 42. 
 122. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (alteration in original). 
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The requirements in Reilly seem to set a high bar because a plaintiff 
might only be able to plead sufficient facts to show that the requirements 
have been met if the plaintiff is the victim of a failed attempt at identity 
theft. Because the requirements focus on the intent and ability of the 
potential thief and do not specifically require a failed attempt on the 
individual plaintiff’s identity, however, this may confer standing on an 
entire class of plaintiffs if there is a failed attempt on only one plaintiff who 
is not the designated representative.123 
The Reilly requirements also seem to address the third Article III 
standing requirement of redressability because showing an indication of a 
potential identity thief’s intent reduces the speculative nature of the injury. 
But how do the requirements make it any more likely that the requested 
relief (damages) is likely to remedy the harm of increased risk of identity 
theft? The plaintiffs may also have to show that the credit-monitoring 
services for which they seek reimbursement were actually effective in 
detecting or stopping the attempted fraud.  
The legal community’s response to the Reilly decision has been mixed. 
Although the Reilly court applied standing doctrine with more rigor than 
any other circuit court, legal scholars criticize it for “creat[ing] an 
unreasonable barrier for injured plaintiffs to reach the merits of their 
cases,”124 and turning plaintiffs “away at the courthouse steps.”125 It creates 
a barrier to consumers seeking redress for their grievances and exposes the 
decision to criticism that often follows dispositions based on standing—that 
courts use standing as over-technical alternatives to deciding cases on the 
merits.126 However, the holding in Reilly is more consistent with recognized 
standing jurisprudence and “serves the guiding twin rationales behind the 
doctrine: separation of powers and judicial efficiency.”127 More recently, 
scholars have begun to recognize that the Third Circuit did not explicitly 
break from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, but distinguished the facts in 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 124. Galbraith, supra note 14, at 1365. 
 125. Id. at 1385. 
 126. See Cave, supra note 24, at 787, n.149 (citing LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT 
SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LAW 39-42 (2001); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1985); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea 
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 664 (1977)). 
 127. Id. at 786-87. 
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Reilly from those of Pisciotta and Krottner.128 Although the Reilly court 
criticized the analytical bases of the other two decisions, the three-prong 
test for standing produces consistent results when applied to the facts in 
those cases.129 
D. The Reilly Test: Stand and Deliver 
Because some fraud risk claims demand redress while others are too 
speculative, the higher standard created by the Third Circuit provides a 
compromise that recognizes potential injury in fact, but excludes the more 
dubious cases. The following analysis of standing doctrine shows why. 
 Injury must be a violation of a legally protected interest that is “actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” to be sufficient for constitutional 
standing.130 Increased risk of identity theft is a risk of a future violation of a 
legally protected interest—an interest in not having one’s identity stolen or 
suffering resultant financial loss or reputational harm vis-à-vis negative 
credit reporting.131 The increased risk itself, however, is not a violation of a 
legally protected interest; the interest is at most one of not being at higher 
risk of becoming a victim of a crime. Even if the risk of future injury in fact 
is implicated, the future injury cannot be characterized as “imminent” 
because its occurrence depends on an intentional crime that may not happen 
at all, let alone “imminently.” 
The injury-in-fact requirement for constitutional standing “is qualitative, 
not quantitative, in nature,” and the attendant “analysis is highly case-
specific.”132 A qualitative evaluation of the nature and probability of the 
harm is pertinent to whether a court should confer standing.133 Some 
circuits require a plaintiff to show that there is a “credible threat of harm” to 
                                                                                                                 
 128. E.g., John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty International and 
Data Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law “Certainly Impending”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 3, ¶¶ 39-40 (2014), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i1/article3.pdf. 
 129. Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011), with Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140-42 (9th Cir. 2010), and Pisciotta v. Old Nat. 
Bankcorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631-32, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).   
 130. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotations marks 
omitted). 
 131. See Identity Theft and Financial Fraud, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/pubs/ID_theft/idtheftlaws.html (last visited Oct. 
22, 2013) (describing identity theft prosecution prior to 1998 as accomplished under “‘false 
personation’ statutes”). 
 132. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 133. See id. 
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establish standing because claims for increased risk of harm are “nebulous” 
and “potentially expansive.”134 
1. Analogies to Other Claims of Future Harm Do Not With-Stand 
Scrutiny 
In recognizing that increased risk of identity theft is an injury in fact, the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits analogize increased risk of identity theft to 
cases involving exposure to toxic substances, defective medical devices, 
and environmental harm.135 But analogies to actions for risk of future 
bodily harm and future environmental harm are inapt for various reasons 
that become apparent on closer inspection of the rationale behind 
recognition of standing for these other claims. 
a) Claims for Medical Monitoring Costs 
In medical-monitoring claims (encompassing injuries arising from both 
toxic-substance exposure and defective medical devices), the purpose of 
medical monitoring is to detect symptoms of harm resulting from an injury 
that has already occurred.136 Bodily injury occurs when a defective medical 
device is implanted and medical monitoring is required “to detect the onset 
of physical harm.”137 Similarly, when a person is exposed to a toxic 
substance, the “exposure itself causes an injury,”138 and medical monitoring 
is used to detect the manifestation of symptoms of the injury that was 
caused by the exposure.139 
In contrast to medical monitoring, credit monitoring does not detect 
symptoms of a harm that has already been initiated. Credit-monitoring 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. (cautioning against broad application of its holding to recognize standing for 
increased risk of sickness resulting from ingestion of contaminated livestock); see Cent. 
Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 135. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old 
Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 136. Bouldry v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
 137. Id. (quoting Wyeth, Inc. v. Gottlieb, 930 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 751, 759 (S.D. W. Va. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Sutton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 
2d 1005, 1008 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)). 
 139. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 449 (1997) (recognizing 
that medical monitoring is “necessary given the latent nature of many diseases caused by 
exposure to hazardous materials”). 
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services are used to detect fraudulent activity,140 which is itself a harm but 
not a symptom of a previous injury. Fraud does not always manifest after a 
data breach, and not all fraud results from data breaches. Identity theft is 
not a consequence of data breach, but of fraud. Data breach is just one of 
many ways in which an identity thief can obtain personal information, 
including mail theft, phishing, and spyware.141 Moreover, data breach itself 
does not result in identity theft unless someone (not necessarily the data 
holder) intentionally and fraudulently uses the compromised data.142 
In addition to the logical distinction between medical-monitoring claims 
and Data Breach Claims, there exists a compelling policy distinction in the 
ultimate injury that was expressed by the court in Reilly.143 To force a 
plaintiff to suffer the physical manifestations of bodily injury or even 
premature death before being able to bring suit is “harsh and economically 
inefficient.”144 Premature death is not remediable. Some diseases resulting 
from toxic-substance exposure are incurable.145 Defective medical devices 
can result in “painful, sometimes life-altering effects” for patients.146 Data 
breaches, on the other hand, create only a risk of financial harm. Although 
financial harm resulting from actual fraud may be great, a financial 
damages award can reverse the harm. 147 Financial institutions generally 
compensate victims of identity fraud who experience direct financial 
losses.148 Individuals who experience fraudulent activity on already-existing 
accounts generally receive expedient compensation from their own 
institutions with minimum effort required on the part of the victim.149  
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Fact Sheet 33: Identity Theft Monitoring Services, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs33-CreditMonitoring.htm (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2013). 
 141. What Is Identity Theft, and How Does It Happen? TRUSTEDID, https://www.trust 
edid.com/types-of-identity-theft (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
 142. See How to Deal with a Security Breach, supra note 6 (“A security breach does not 
necessarily mean that you will become a victim of identity theft.”). 
 143. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 144. Id. (quoting Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 145. E.g., Asbestosis, ASBESTOS.COM, http://www.asbestos.com/asbestosis (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2013) (explaining that asbestosis, which is a disease caused by inhalation of 
asbestos, has no known cure). 
 146. See Defective Medical Devices, DRUGWATCH, http://www.drugwatch.com/medical-
devices (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 147. See Rod J. Rosenstein & Tamera Fine, Identity Theft: Coordination Can Defeat the 
Modern-Day “King” and “Duke,” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
briefing_room/fin/id_theft.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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However, identity theft may result in harms other than direct financial 
loss. For example, a criminal may use someone else’s identity when 
interacting with law enforcement, which may result in a false entry in the 
fraud victim’s criminal history or even an outstanding warrant.150 Even in 
these cases, however, the harm is remediable—albeit in ways that place the 
burden on the victim.151 
Medical monitoring also differs from credit monitoring as a preventive 
measure in key aspects. When specific conduct (e.g., toxic-substance 
exposure, implantation of a defective medical device, or even a car accident 
resulting in a possible head injury) necessitates particular medical 
diagnostic measures, the cost is “neither inconsequential nor of a kind the 
community generally accepts as part of the wear and tear of daily life.”152 
Yet the monetary cost of medical monitoring can mitigate or prevent 
irreversible damages. For example, exposure to asbestos may increase 
chances of suffering from lung cancer.153 Early detection of lung cancer 
through medical monitoring can allow a patient to start treatment early and 
perhaps even lower the risk of dying from the disease.154 Even if credit 
monitoring lowers the risk or the severity of damages arising from fraud or 
identity theft, those damages, unlike death, are completely remediable by a 
monetary damage award. Thus, although some courts may be willing to 
recognize standing in medical-monitoring cases, there is a compelling 
policy reason for the expansion of standing in these cases that doesn’t exist 
in credit monitoring cases: without medical monitoring, people could die 
sooner than with medical monitoring.  
Suits that involve conduct contributing to environmental harm, like 
medical-monitoring suits, do not depend on an intentional criminal act of a 
third party to bring about the threatened injury. Although in some 
environmental-harm cases, plaintiffs seek injunctions to prevent continued 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Fact Sheet 17g: Criminal Identity Theft: What to Do if It Happens to You, PRIVACY 
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/criminal-identity-theft-what-to-do-
if-it-happens-to-you (last visited May 11, 2015). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
 153. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 app. H (2014) (“[S]tudies have shown a definite association 
between exposure to asbestos and an increased incidence of lung cancer . . . .”). 
 154. Lung Cancer Prevention and Early Detection, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www. 
cancer.org/cancer/lungcancer-non-smallcell/moreinformation/lungcancerpreventionandearlyde 
tection/lung-cancer-ped-toc (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
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unlawful conduct,155 the conduct sought to be enjoined is the direct cause of 
threatened injury.156 In data breach cases, however, the conduct of the 
defendant (failing to prevent a data breach) may increase the risk of future 
identity theft, but cannot, on its own, cause the identity theft. Further, the 
threatened harm of identity fraud is not necessarily associated with a higher 
likelihood that the defendant will commit identity theft, but that some third 
party might.157  
b) Claims of Environmental Harm 
Courts also recognized standing for fraud risk based on analogy to 
claims for environmental harm.158 Just as in medical-monitoring cases, this 
analogy improperly compares causal relationships in environmental-harm 
suits with causal relationships in Data Breach Claims. Plaintiffs in 
environmental harm suits object to conduct that causes environmental harm 
directly—not conduct that causes environmental harm in conjunction with 
conduct of an independent third party.159  
Moreover, the nature of the injury in fact differs between environmental-
harm suits and Data Breach Claims. The violated interest or right in 
environmental-harm suits is the judicially recognized interest of a plaintiff 
to enjoy “the aesthetic and recreational values” of an affected 
environment.160 If the threatened environmental harm occurs and results in 
permanent destruction of an endangered species161 or streams and forests, 
then the violated interest may never recover.162 For example, no amount of 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 173 (2000) (discussing citizen suit for injunctive relief to compel defendants to comply 
with the Clean Water Act). 
 156. See, e.g., id. at 175-76, 181-82 (describing plaintiffs’ injuries as arising from 
defendant’s discharge of unacceptably high levels of mercury into a waterway). 
 157. See How to Deal with a Security Breach, supra note 6 (describing data breach 
scenarios in which sensitive information is obtained by third parties, such as third-party 
hacking, theft by third parties, and sale to third parties). 
 158. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old 
Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 159. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 175-77. 
 160. Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). 
 161. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978, 995-96 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
 162. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 528 F. Supp. 2d 625, 631-
32 (2007) (explaining that permanent harm to streams and forests could occur due to 
defendant’s plan to fill valleys during mining operations).  
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money can ever resurrect extinct species like the Tecopa Pupfish.163 Identity 
theft, however, is remediable by monetary compensation of direct financial 
loss and correction of credit reports or criminal records. 164 
Environmental-harm suits also have a stronger basis for standing than 
data breach suits in the current legal environment because there are specific 
citizen-suit provisions in statutes like the Clean Air Act165 and the Clean 
Water Act.166 As discussed in subsection A of Part II of this comment, 
statutory creation of a legal right and a concomitant cause of action can 
form a sufficient basis for standing if the plaintiffs can also show a 
particularized injury. 
2. Pisciotta and Krottner Still Stand Under the Reilly Test  
The Third Circuit’s dictum in Reilly leaves room for distinction from the 
facts in Pisciotta and Krottner rather than complete rejection of those 
decisions. The Reilly standard allows for recognition of standing if the 
perpetrator of the data breach “(1) read, copied, and understood [the 
plaintiffs’] personal information; (2) intends to commit future criminal acts 
by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information to the 
detriment of [the plaintiffs] by making unauthorized transactions in 
[plaintiffs’] names.”167 The standard restricts standing to claims that more 
likely include injury that is not just speculative because it applies to a 
category of claims in which data is actually compromised. Although the 
injury still depends on a third party’s successful fraud attempt, the 
likelihood of the attempt and of its success is higher when the Reilly 
standard is met. 
When the standard in Reilly’s dictum is applied to facts from Pisciotta 
and Krottner, the results may still be confusing and dissatisfying. In 
Pisciotta, the data breach occurred when a hacker gained unauthorized 
access to the systems of the defendant’s hosting facility.168 The ensuing 
investigation of the data breach described the intrusion as “sophisticated, 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Jill Harness, 7 Animals Humans Brought to Extinction, NEATORAMA (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.neatorama.com/2011/02/02/7-animals-humans-brought-to-extinction/#!lYd2D 
(explaining the demise of the Tecopa Pupfish as caused by the canalization of hot springs 
into bath houses in the Mojave Desert). 
 164. See supra Part III.1.a (noting harm incurred in identity theft is different from harm 
incurred in medical monitoring claims due to its compensable nature). 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012). 
 166. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
 167. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 168. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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intentional and malicious.”169 The Third Circuit stressed the finding of the 
investigative report from Pisciotta as a basis of Pisciotta’s lesser persuasive 
value.170 The description from the report may make it seem more likely that 
the hacker “read, copied, and understood”171 the personal information 
accessed because the intrusion was “sophisticated.”172 It may have been 
more likely that the hacker “intend[ed] to commit future criminal acts by 
misusing the information”173 because the intrusion was “intentional and 
malicious.”174 And because the intrusion was “sophisticated, intentional and 
malicious,”175 it is more likely that the hacker was “able to use such 
information to the detriment of [the plaintiffs] by making unauthorized 
transactions in [the plaintiffs’] names.”176  
However, there is no mention in the opinion or briefing for Pisciotta of 
any actual attempt, failed or successful, of identity theft. The full results of 
the investigation were filed under seal, and the opinion gave no explanation 
of the basis of the characterization of the intrusion as “sophisticated, 
intentional and malicious” or the manner in which the description was 
used.177 A sophisticated, intentional and malicious attack could have been 
aimed at the hosting facility system or at the data of any of the hosting 
facility’s other customers. The further question remains unanswered: if the 
attack was so malicious and sophisticated as to render actual attempts at 
identity theft likely, why did no attempt occur between the dates of the 
attack in 2005178 and the argument in the appellate court in 2007?179 The 
description of the intrusion (sophisticated, intentional, and malicious) does 
not specifically indicate that the intruder read, copied, and understood the 
specific information at issue. 
Application of the Third Circuit’s standard to the facts in Krottner makes 
the injury appear much more likely because one of the plaintiffs received a 
warning one month after receiving notification of the data breach that 
“someone had attempted to open a new account using [the plaintiff’s] social 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44. 
 171. Id. at 42. 
 172. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632. 
 173. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42. 
 174. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42. 
 177. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 
2011) (No. 06-3817), 2007 WL 5514190, at *2. 
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security number.”180 Even if the failed attempt had not occurred, other facts 
provided sufficient bases to argue that because the data breach resulted 
from the theft of a laptop that housed “unencrypted names, addresses, and 
social security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks employees,”181 
the hacker had likely “read, copied, and understood [the plaintiffs’] . . . 
information; . . . [intended] to commit future criminal acts by misusing the 
information; and . . . [was] able to use such information to the detriment of 
[the plaintiffs]” by attempting to steal their identities.182 
However, Krottner poses another problem with redressability. When 
Starbucks notified its employees of the data breach, it offered credit-watch 
services through Equifax for one year.183 The plaintiffs alleged that they had 
enrolled in the credit-watch services offered by Starbucks, but would 
continue incurring costs for credit monitoring after the expiration of the free 
services, and that despite the use of the credit-watch services plaintiffs still 
expended substantial amounts of time on personally monitoring their 
accounts and experienced generalized anxiety.184  
The position of the Krottner plaintiffs raises two concerns. First, if 
increased risk of identity theft is sufficient as an injury in fact, how long 
does a person suffer that injury? If private data is posted on the internet and 
downloaded a thousand times, each person who downloaded it could retain 
hard copies of the information for decades; does that create an injury that 
requires decades of credit monitoring to redress? Second, if plaintiffs 
suffered injury (time spent monitoring accounts and generalized emotional 
distress) despite their use of credit-watch services, then an award of 
damages is probably insufficient to redress the plaintiffs’ injury. Notably, 
the defendant in Reilly stated in its trial briefing that the plaintiffs “[did] not 
indicate whether they enrolled in the free credit monitoring and identity 
theft protection program offered by Ceridian through Equifax. They 
[merely] allege[d] that the program offered by Ceridian was 
‘inadequate.’”185  
                                                                                                                 
 180. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 181. Id. at 1140. 
 182. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 183. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1141. 
 184. Id. 
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A court creates a “[d]etriment to [c]onsumers” by not recognizing 
standing186 and even risks “unjustly limiting plaintiffs’ access to the 
court.”187 But critics should consider the fact that data breach suits have 
consistently failed when asserted on traditional common law causes of 
action, even when standing is recognized, because increased risk of identity 
theft does not constitute a compensable injury.188 If a court chooses to 
recognize standing but not compensable injury on the basis of increased 
risk of identity theft, then all the court has accomplished is granting 
plaintiffs the opportunity to go through additional (and costly) legal 
maneuvering, limited discovery, and even appellate proceedings, only to 
lose on summary judgment or dismissal.189 Even if recognition of standing 
serves to increase the settlement value of a claim,190 the cost of pre-trial 
litigation and small chance of success on the merits may outweigh the 
probable increase in value.  
Thus, it is clear that the expansion of standing doctrine to include cases 
of increased risk of identity theft is not only inappropriate, but practically 
ineffective in providing plaintiffs with a satisfactory means of redress. 
III. I Can’t Get No Relief 
Even if courts recognize standing, plaintiffs still face obstacles in 
establishing prima facie elements of common law claims. An understanding 
of the merits of a Data Breach Claim in the context of the common law 
causes of actions that plaintiffs typically allege is instructive in the 
development of a practical solution. In most cases, courts deny recovery 
because the causes of action pursued (i.e. negligence, breach of implied 
contract, and infliction of emotional distress) require a showing of 
compensable injury, which neither increased risk of identity theft nor the 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Cave, supra note 24, at 786. 
 187. Galbraith, supra note 14, at 1386-87. 
 188. See generally Zitter, supra note 59. 
 189. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App’x 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 190. See Edward Brunet, Essay, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
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summary judgment is denied.”). Because standing is a threshold issue, early challenges to 
standing may allow defendants to avoid some costs, such as discovery. If the court rejects 
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2013). 
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cost of credit-monitoring services sufficiently establish.191 Aside from 
issues of damages, however, other pitfalls may cause a data breach claim to 
fail just as easily. For example, there may be difficulties in establishing 
causation if a plaintiff has experienced any data breaches in the past 
because a plaintiff may have to show that the identity theft, which has not 
yet occurred, would have been caused by the defendant’s data breach and 
not the prior data breach. Understanding the totality of difficulties facing 
plaintiffs in the current environment will assist in determining what a 
plaintiff should be fairly expected to prove in order to recover for increased 
risk of identity theft. 
A. Deal with the Devil: Implied Contract Claims 
Where no express contract exists that imposes liability on a defendant for 
data breach, plaintiffs have sued for breach of implied contract.192 The 
primary difference between an express contract and an implied contract is 
that in an implied contract, there is no direct evidence of an agreement.193 
An implied contract can be implied in fact, such as through a course of 
dealing between the parties that supports an implicit agreement to shift 
liability to one party.194 An implied contract can also be implied in law, 
such as through a relationship between the parties or ordinary trade 
practices that support the imposition of liability by the law in the interest of 
justice.195 Once an agreement or obligation is established, the legal effect of 
an implied contract is the same as that of an express contract.196 
1. If It Ain’t Broke: Lack of Compensable Damages 
Courts largely dispense with claims for breach of implied contract 
because data breach claims do not allege compensable damages as required 
under applicable state law.197 Some state law, however, allows for recovery 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See generally Zitter, supra note 59. 
 192. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta 
v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 193. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 14(e) (2004). 
 194. Id. 
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of mitigation costs that are reasonable and foreseeable.198 Whether the costs 
are reasonable and foreseeable depends on an evaluation of the facts of the 
case and may require a showing of criminal intent or actual identity theft 
rather than “inadvertently misplaced or lost data.”199  
2. No Deal: Existence of Implied Contract 
The existence of an implied contract is fundamental to a claim for its 
breach. Some courts have found that a contract was “implied in fact” when 
a customer used a credit or debit card in a commercial transaction—
presumably with the agreement of the vendor to take “reasonable measures 
to protect the information.”200 Other courts, however, have not found an 
implied contract on the basis of public statements emphasizing a 
defendant’s commitment to safeguarding its customer’s private information, 
even when plaintiffs alleged that they would not have supplied their 
personal information absent such an implied contractual obligation.201  
As a practical matter, plaintiffs in those cases failed to allege that they 
had read or received and understood the defendant’s public statements prior 
to supplying their personal information.202 Moreover, plaintiffs did not 
allege that they relied on the defendant’s statements as assent to a 
contractual obligation when they supplied their personal information.203 It is 
unlikely, in a typical commercial transaction for sale of goods or services, 
that protection of payment information is as essential to obtain assent as the 
receipt of goods or services themselves. However, where such a 
commercial transaction already exists, a court may view the obligation to 
protect a customer’s information as an implied condition to the already-
existing agreement.204  
                                                                                                                 
 198. E.g., Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 162, 166-67 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(noting that courts in Maine allow for recovery of reasonable mitigation costs, and holding 
that costs to obtain replacement debit and credit cards and costs of identity theft insurance 
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 199. Id. at 164 (“This case involves a large-scale criminal operation . . . and the 
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Courts may imply a contractual duty to protect customer information 
because of public policy reasons. For example, courts have found an 
implied condition to protect client information in the doctor-patient 
relationship,205 but not in the context of a typical claim for data breach. The 
deeply confidential nature of the relationship between a patient and her 
doctor may compel the court to recognize the implied condition; the doctor-
patient relationship is fundamentally based on trust and confidentiality 
because the promise of confidentiality encourages patients to fully disclose 
even the most embarrassing details of their lives in order to receive 
effective medical care.206 By comparison, the relationship between a typical 
commercial vendor and a customer is not subject to the same public policy 
considerations. The underlying interest in protecting doctor-patient 
relationships is to encourage public health and safety, whereas creation of a 
similar obligation in a typical commercial transaction would merely seek to 
protect a customer’s finances. 
3. We Didn’t Start the Fire: Proving Causation 
Even if a court recognizes a contractual obligation in a Data Breach 
Claim, the plaintiff must still show a causal relationship between the 
defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s injury.207 There is no detailed analysis 
of the causation element of breach of contract in a setting for increased risk 
of identity theft. Even when actual identity theft occurs, this may not be 
easy—a plaintiff must plead more than the fact that identity theft occurred 
after a data breach.208  
For example, both the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits held that a causal 
connection between data breach and actual identity theft was sufficiently 
plead when plaintiffs alleged that they had not previously been the victims 
of identity theft, that they were very careful in securing their private 
information, and that the information lost in the defendant’s data breach 
                                                                                                                 
public policy considerations). Note, however, that the public policy considerations arising 
from a doctor-patient contract generally do not arise between parties in a Data Breach Claim. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 801-02; see also Susan Dorr Goold & Mack Lipkin, The Doctor-Patient 
Relationship: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S26, 
S32 (1999), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1496871/pdf/jgi 
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 207. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 208. Id. at 1326-27 (citing Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. App’x 
664, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
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was the same type of information used to steal their identities.209 These 
requirements may be helpful in pleading causation for the increased risk of 
identity theft. However, this standard is not helpful to a plaintiff who 
suffered identity theft prior to the data breach. As an alternative, it would be 
logical for such a plaintiff to be required to show that the defendant’s data 
breach is more likely to be the cause of the identity theft than whatever 
circumstances gave rise to a previous identity theft. For example, if the 
recent identity theft involved the use of the plaintiff’s social security 
number, but the prior identity theft was caused by misuse of the plaintiff’s 
credit card information (and the plaintiff’s social security number was not 
previously compromised), then the recent theft would more likely result 
from the defendant’s data breach. 
The standard of proving causation for identity theft is open to substantial 
criticism. Even if a plaintiff can show that he was not previously the victim 
of identity theft, that he exercised care in protecting his personal 
information, and that the data compromised in the breach was the same data 
used in the identity theft, he has not shown that the identity theft is not as 
likely to have resulted from some other third party’s loss or sale of his 
information.210 This criticism applies somewhat in the context of a claim for 
only increased risk of identity theft. If many third parties could potentially 
be responsible for the compromise of a plaintiff’s data that may lead to 
identity theft, then credit-monitoring services would be no more necessary 
after the defendant’s data breach than they would have been absent the 
defendant’s data breach.  
On the other hand, requiring a plaintiff to prove that no other third party 
may have been responsible for some increased risk of identity theft is 
impractical because it requires in-depth investigation of whether any third 
parties that have access to the same information experienced data breaches. 
Not all of those third parties may have reported a data breach and not all of 
those third parties are necessarily aware of data breaches that occurred. For 
example, a plaintiff’s social security number may be in the databases of 
utility companies, cell phone carriers, banks, and current or prior 
employers.211 Moreover, other third parties whom the plaintiff does not 
even know may have caused increased risk of identity theft by erroneously 
                                                                                                                 
 209. Id. at 1327; Stollenwerk, 254 F. App’x at 668. 
 210. Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1330-31 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff had 
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entering another person’s data or randomly using the plaintiff’s data in an 
attempt to evade law enforcement action.212 
At the opposite end of the spectrum of proving causation, a court could 
find that any proven data breach automatically causes increased risk of 
identity theft. Just as the risk of being in an automobile crash is increased 
by virtue of simply being on the roadway, a misplaced hard drive or 
erroneous email attachment increases the risk of identity theft. Of course, 
such a loose standard for causation would render the requirement 
meaningless. A court could require a plaintiff to show that he would not 
require credit-monitoring services but for the defendant’s data breach.213 
Alternatively, a court could require a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s 
data breach was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s increased risk of 
identity theft.214 In this standard, the plaintiff’s general habits in protecting 
his data would help determine whether the defendant’s data breach 
significantly contributed to the plaintiff’s risk of identity theft or if the data 
breach was just a drop in the bucket.215 
B. A Tort of Course: Claims of Negligence 
The elements of a negligence claim vary by jurisdiction, but the common 
breakdown involves a tortfeasor’s duty to the victim, a breached standard of 
care, and factual/proximate causation of actual damages.216 Factual 
causation and actual damages face the same evidentiary obstacles in 
negligence claims as in claims for breach of contract.217 Further difficulties 
may arise in establishing breach of the standard of care and proximate 
cause. 
1. (Data) Breach of Standard of Care 
One requirement of negligence is that the tortfeasor’s conduct must 
deviate from that of a reasonable prudent person.218 In the case of a data 
breach, the deviation in question would be from what a reasonable prudent 
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2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20140205224709/http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/ 
odds-someone-else-has-your-ssn-one-7-6C10406347.  
 213. See But-For Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (9th ed. 2009).   
 214. See Substantial-Cause Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (9th ed. 2009). 
 215. See id. 
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 217. E.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see supra Part III.A. 
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data holder would do to protect the data in its possession. If the data holder 
breached an agreement with its client regarding data security, then a breach 
of contract claim would apply. In the absence of a breached agreement, 
standards for the data-holder’s conduct may be developed from applicable 
regulations219 and industry-specific custom.220  
a) Current Data Security Regulations 
A statutorily defined standard of care must describe reasonable security 
measures with enough specificity to be of any assistance beyond 
establishing a duty to exercise reasonable care.221 However, no current 
regulation mandates standards with any helpful specificity.222 For example, 
California’s Security Breach Information Act, which serves as a model in 
other jurisdictions, imposes a duty on data holders.223 Yet even this statute 
only requires a business to “implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information.”224 
The generality of the statutory language does not help a business determine 
what level of data encryption or security software to use. Instead, whether 
the business used “reasonable security procedures and practices”—a 
standard with no more meaning than conduct of a reasonable prudent 
person—is left to the trier of fact to determine with no guidance.225 
Both the White House and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have 
recognized the need for security standards. In its February 2012 
recommendation for “A Framework for Protecting Privacy,” the White 
House advocated for members of various industries or interest groups to 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort 
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 264 (2005) (“A statute may impose a duty to exercise care to 
protect data from intruders, either by the legislation’s express terms or by a court’s holding 
that a statute which is silent as to civil liability sets the appropriate standard of care for a tort 
action.”) (citations omitted). 
 220. E.g., Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data 
Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1071 (2009) 
(discussing industry self-regulation vis-à-vis credit card companies establishing security 
guidelines to which merchants must conform). 
 221. Johnson, supra note 219, at 265-268. 
 222. Cave, supra note 24, at 781-82. 
 223. Johnson, supra note 219, at 264-65. 
 224. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2006), amended by 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 
855 (West) (modifying the businesses included under the subsection to include those which 
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collaborate and develop governing codes of conduct.226 The codes would 
not result in binding regulation, but would provide a standard to which the 
FTC may refer in enforcement actions.227 By keeping development and 
maintenance of the codes in the control of the “stakeholders,” the White 
House intended to encourage stakeholder commitment, allow agile 
adjustment in a “rapidly evolving marketplace,” and help stakeholders build 
consumer trust.228 
The FTC released a report in March 2012 (“the Final Report”) that 
encouraged the development of baseline privacy legislation.229 The 
legislation would be intended to provide security standards for those data 
holders that did not already have minimum standards and enforce the 
standards against companies that intentionally ignored them.230 The 
proposed legislation would “provide adequate deterrence through the 
availability of civil penalties and other remedies.”231 However, the 
recommendations made no specific reference to providing a private right of 
action or remedy that would directly benefit the data subjects.232 Still, as a 
set of “minimum standards,” such legislation may be helpful to a trier of 
fact in determining whether conduct breaches a standard of care. 
b) Other Sources of Standards 
In the meantime, fact finders must rely on evidence such as industry 
norms from other data holders of similar size and purpose or internal 
records regarding security procedures. However, many industries do not 
establish norms that are consistently implemented, and courts may not even 
recognize basic security safeguards. 
For example, the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota 
found no breach of duty when the laptop of a student loan company 
                                                                                                                 
 226. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A 
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employee was stolen during the burglary of his home.233 The laptop 
contained unencrypted data on the company’s customers, including names, 
addresses, social security numbers and loan balances.234 The company 
notified all of its customers of the breach because the employee did not 
keep track of exactly what data was permanently saved on the laptop’s hard 
drive.235 
The plaintiff alleged that the company breached its duty of reasonable 
care “by (1) providing [the employee] with [personal information] that he 
did not need for the task at hand, (2) permitting [the employee] to continue 
keeping [personal information] in an unattended, insecure personal 
residence, and (3) allowing [the employee] to keep [personal information] 
on his laptop unencrypted.”236 The plaintiff additionally asserted that this 
conduct violated the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which requires companies 
to develop and implement their own data security procedures.237 
The district court concluded that the company did not breach a duty of 
reasonable care because the company had security procedures and 
authorized the employee to access the data pursuant to his duties.238 
Because the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not specifically require that 
personal information be encrypted, the district court declined to find a 
breach based on violation of the statute.239 
The plaintiff additionally alleged negligent behavior with respect to the 
company’s own policy of “restrict[ing] access to nonpublic personal 
information to authorized persons who need to know such information.”240 
Once again, the district court agreed that because the company complied 
with its own procedures in training the employee to handle the data, and 
because those procedures were presumably not violated, no breach 
occurred.241 
The district court’s findings are disturbing because they appear to rely 
solely on the defendant’s own internally developed policies to determine a 
                                                                                                                 
 233. Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 
288483, at *3-5 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006). 
 234. Id. at *1-2. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at *4 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“personal 
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standard of reasonable conduct. However, a search for a more objective 
industry standard or “best practice” could have led a fact finder to disagree. 
For example, one security company has circulated “Laptop Security Best 
Practices” that recommends encryption of all customer records,242 cable 
locks for laptops in the home,243 and disk-wipe technology in case of loss or 
theft.244  
Litigators should arm themselves with similar bases for best practices. 
Otherwise, when companies who experience data breaches have not 
violated a statute or their own internal security policies, courts have little 
guidance as to what constitutes failure to exercise reasonable care. 
2. Proximate Cause 
Where a data breach occurs as a result of a third party’s criminal act, 
plaintiffs in data breach cases have further difficulties proving that the 
defendant’s negligence proximately caused the breach. As the district court 
for the District of Minnesota recited, “As a general rule, the criminal act of 
a third party is an intervening efficient cause sufficient to break the chain of 
causation, provided that the criminal act was not foreseeable and there was 
no special relationship between the parties.”245 As data breaches become 
more commonplace, the intervening act may be more foreseeable, but 
burglary of a home in a “relatively safe” neighborhood resulting in laptop 
theft is not foreseeable.246 Thus, criminal acts may break the chain of 
causation if they were not foreseeable. If a burglary of a home in a 
“relatively safe” neighborhood was not foreseeable, perhaps hacking into a 
relatively secure server is similarly unforeseeable.  
IV. There Must Be Some Kind of Way Out of Here 
As the number of people affected by data breaches continues to rise,247 
public awareness of data breaches and backlash against those with whom 
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consumers trust their information has also risen.248 Identity theft rates are 
rising249 and victims of data breaches face much larger chances of 
becoming fraud victims than others.250 As the parties who are best 
positioned to safeguard against data breaches, businesses should bear the 
weight of the liability.  
A. Indecent Proposals: Current Suggestions for Solutions 
In the current environment, plaintiffs have little to no chance of 
recovering for a data breach claim. Not only is there difficulty in 
establishing the prima facie elements of a common law tort,251 but courts 
may not even recognize standing to sue for increased fraud risk.252 
Some scholars propose that the threshold standing issue should be 
addressed by rejecting the Third Circuit’s position.253 Others propose 
comprehensive privacy legislation that includes a private right of action and 
an explicit grant of authority to the FTC to establish and enforce business 
privacy practices.254 Congress should establish a statutory right of action 
that adopts the Third Circuit’s test for standing. While the statute may 
authorize the FTC to promulgate guidelines for businesses to follow, the 
right of action should clearly demarcate the types of conduct that create 
liability, regardless of meeting FTC guidelines. 
Currently, the FTC enforces privacy standards by prosecuting 
enforcement lawsuits pursuant to section 5 of the FTC Act.255 This 
provision authorizes the FTC to prevent various entities from engaging in 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”256 Under 
the “deceptive acts” prong of section 5, the FTC prosecutes breaches of 
                                                                                                                 
 248. E.g., Martha C. White, Cost of Data Breach Could Give Target Sticker Shock, NBC 
NEWS (Jan. 10, 2014), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20140111024900/http:// 
www.nbcnews.com/business/cost-data-breach-could-give-target-sticker-shock-2D11899205 
(discussing the public backlash on social media websites). 
 249. See Richard Rubin, Criminal Identity Theft Investigations Rise 66% at IRS, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-07/criminal-identity-
theft-investigations-rise-66-at-irs.html. 
 250. Weisbaum, supra note 247 (“Someone who’s had their data breached is 14 times 
more likely to become a fraud victim . . . .”) 
 251. See supra Part III. 
 252. See supra Part II. 
 253. E.g., Galbraith, supra note 14, at 1398-99 (“[A]lthough data breach victims may fail 
to recover damages at trial . . . [they] deserve their day in court.”) 
 254. Cave, supra note 24, at 789-90. 
 255. See Chiu, supra note 24, at 287-88; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 229, 
at vi, 24. 
 256. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
554 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:519 
 
 
privacy statements.257 The FTC has also used the “‘unfair practices’” prong 
against companies “that have violated consumers’ privacy rights, or misled 
them by failing to maintain security for sensitive consumer information.”258 
Authority to enforce privacy rights under the “unfair practices” prong has, 
however, come under recent attack in federal court.259 
If Congress grants express authority to the FTC to establish and enforce 
data security guidelines, businesses will receive more guidance as to how to 
protect consumer data.260 The threat of enforcement with civil fines will 
deter businesses from deliberately putting consumer data at risk of 
exposure.261 However, provision of data security guidelines alone does not 
provide a mechanism for recovery by injured parties. Furthermore, 
compliance with administrative guidelines may preempt recovery in cases 
where a data holder’s conduct warrants liability. Rather than evaluate 
possible negligence based on the facts before a court, the court may 
presume that compliance with FTC guidelines equates to conformity with a 
standard of care—even if the guidelines merely establish a “floor” of data 
security measures.262 
B. Jumping Hurdles: Requirements for an Effective Private Right of Action 
Data breach victims need a private right of action that removes 
unreasonable and unpredictable barriers to recovery. Furthermore, data 
holders need guidance on how best to protect their customers’ data and 
reduce risk of liability for data breaches. 
1. Standing Strong  
A statutory right of action represents Congress’s acknowledgement of a 
legally redressable injury.263 In this case, the newly cognizable injury is 
increased risk of identity theft. However, the injury recognized in the 
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statute must be particularized in order to remain within the boundaries of 
Article III.264 Thus, the private right of action should be provided for 
plaintiffs whose information was subject to a data breach. If no data breach 
has occurred, a plaintiff cannot bring an enforcement action against his or 
her data holder to prevent a data breach, even if the statute authorizes it. 
Such a plaintiff would not have a sufficiently particularized injury to satisfy 
constitutional standing requirements. 
The idea of taking action to prevent a data breach seems favorable 
compared to making a plaintiff wait until his or data is irreversibly 
compromised. But allowing a consumer to prosecute an enforcement action 
would not only fail to provide standing, it would effectively allow 
consumers to unnecessarily interfere with the management of many data 
holders’ security procedures. Furthermore, in order to ensure that suits 
brought under the proposed statute are limited to plaintiffs who actually 
suffer increased risk of identity theft, the statute should incorporate the 
standing requirements of the Third Circuit. To wit, a plaintiff should be able 
to show that the perpetrator of a data breach “(1) read, copied, and 
understood [the plaintiffs’] personal information; (2) intends to commit 
future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such 
information to the detriment of [the plaintiffs] by making unauthorized 
transactions in [plaintiffs’] names.”265 
The Third Circuit’s test, in effect, allows only actual victims to sue for a 
data breach—not just anyone who suspects his or her data was 
compromised in the hands of a company. The test also ensures that 
plaintiffs suffer actual increased risk of identity theft by requiring that the 
compromised information could even be used for identity theft. Rather than 
turn plaintiffs away at the courthouse steps, the Third Circuit test imposes 
basic requirements of plausibility to the alleged injury. 
Because standing requirements should not be unduly burdensome in 
facilitating access to courts, application of the Third Circuit’s test need not 
be painstaking. For example, a showing of intent to misuse compromised 
information may be satisfied by showing that the plaintiff’s information 
was the only data (or in one of a few categories of data) that was 
compromised. To show that the plaintiff’s data was “understood,” a 
plaintiff may be required to show that the data was in an understandable 
format, such as with little or no encryption. 
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By adopting the Third Circuit’s standing requirements, a statutory right 
of action would allow plaintiffs access to the courts in a manner consistent 
with emerging case law. The requirements impose a low burden of 
plausibility to ensure actual injury in fact. Simultaneously, legislative 
recognition of increased risk of identity theft as a legally cognizable injury 
promotes consistent recognition of standing, especially in lower courts that 
may not yet recognize standing for data breach claims. 
2. The Common Law Obstacle Course 
a) Damages 
Currently, data breach claims that survive challenges to standing fail for 
lack of compensable damages.266 The easiest way to remedy this issue is to 
provide for recovery of costs listed in the statute. Plaintiffs should recover 
for actual reasonable costs incurred for credit-monitoring services.  
 Courts should evaluate the ability of credit-monitoring services to 
adequately remedy increased risk of identity theft in light of a variety of 
factors. For example, the type of data compromised may affect the level of 
risk to which the plaintiff is exposed and warrant more comprehensive 
credit monitoring. The type of data compromised may also affect the length 
of time for which credit monitoring is reasonable. A compromised social 
security number will require longer and more intense monitoring than a 
home address or license plate number. Also, the amount that the plaintiff 
stands to lose or for which the plaintiff may be liable may warrant more 
comprehensive credit monitoring. Thus, characteristics like assets and 
available credit may factor into a claim’s value. If the data holder has 
already offered to pay for credit-monitoring services, the plaintiff’s decision 
to either forego that service or obtain additional services may also factor 
into whether the cost is reasonable.267 
Additionally, plaintiffs should recover for reasonable time spent 
safeguarding against identity theft as a result of a data breach. Time spent 
safeguarding against identity theft may include reasonable time spent 
contacting banks to change account numbers, contacting credit bureaus to 
initiate fraud alerts, and taking other remedial measures specifically in 
response to notification of the data breach.  
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b) Standard of Care 
Comprehensive regulatory guidelines could give businesses guidance on 
best practices for data security.268 Development of guidelines must account 
for changes in technology across a broad spectrum of types and sizes of 
data holders.269 The FTC may be on track to obtain authority to establish 
and enforce guidelines,270 and time will tell if the FTC is successful in 
promulgating agile and effective guidelines. 
Regardless of the efficacy of FTC regulations, the statutory right of 
action should clarify that liability does not rest solely on noncompliance 
with the guidelines. The guidelines should factor prominently in any 
analysis of liability, but courts must retain discretion to judge data holder 
liability regardless of regulatory compliance or violation. Judicial discretion 
allows for consideration of facts unique to any situation, which may not 
have factored into the guidelines. Discretion also reduces the probability of 
reliance on bad guidelines. 
Allowing for liability regardless of compliance with regulatory 
guidelines creates some uncertainty for businesses as to whether their 
conduct is sufficient to avoid liability. But judicial discretion also allows 
data holders to avoid liability despite noncompliance where abnormal 
situations may warrant it. Furthermore, absence of discretion robs the 
judicial process of meaning; courts should have authority to dispense justice 
according to reason and policy as well as guidance from regulatory 
agencies. 
V. Conclusion: All Along the Watchtower 
Rapid changes in technology and in the extent to which individuals place 
their sensitive information at the mercy of third parties have outpaced the 
ability of the government to keep up. As a result, victims of data breaches 
have been left in the cold with no recourse. But with the help of Congress 
and the FTC in outlining privacy rights, those victims can regain control 
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and prosecute those rights in a judicial system that has addressed thorny 
issues with practicality and judiciousness for centuries. 
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